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Abstract
Many papers have documented a wage premium in foreign-owned and large firms. However, there is
very little formal theory in the literature and empirical analyses are typically not based on hypotheses
which are rigorously derived from theory. This paper contributes to the theory-empirics gap by
developing a model that allows for two “pure” explanations for the wage premium. The first is a
heterogenous-worker explanation along the lines of Yeaple (2005), where firms that select more scale-
intensive technologies select ex-ante more productive workers. In this case, the wage premium is a
pure selection phenomenon. The second explanation builds on the heterogeneous-firm model of Melitz
(2003) combined with on-the-job learning as in Markusen (2001). Productivity differences between
firms are internalized by ex-ante homogeneous workers, so the wage premium is a pure learning
phenomenon due to ex-post higher productivity in foreign firms. Our model yields a number of precise
empirical hypotheses. When these predictions are tested on Danish matched employer-employee data,
we find that both explanations play a role in explaining the observed wage premium. Specifically, the
foreign- and large-firm premiums explained by selection are in the neighborhood of 30-65% of the
total premium, with the remainder consistent with learning. There is also considerable support for a
number of other predictions specific to the worker-learning explanation.
Acknowledgments: The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this project from the
Danish National Agency for Enterprise and Construction. The paper has greatly benefitted from
comments and suggestions by participants and formal discussants at many workshops and conferences
in the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia.
1 Other theoretical explanations of the foreign wage premium offered in the literature include
higher labor demand volatility in foreign plants (Fabri et al., 2003); compensation for a higher closure
rate in foreign firms (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003) or compensation due to preferences by workers for
domestic firms (Lipsey, 2004). We should also note that we are not dealing with the question of how
liberalization leading to inward foreign investment affects the wages of all workers (see, e.g.,
Markusen and Venables, 2000).
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1. Introduction
A number of papers have documented that foreign (and large) firms pay higher wages and, to
the best of our knowledge, no study has found the opposite. However, there is relatively little formal
theory in the literature and empirical analyses are typically not based on hypotheses which are
rigorously derived from theory. 
This paper contributes to the theory-empirics gap by developing a model that allows for two
“pure” explanations of the wage premium: a heterogenous-worker explanation along the lines of
Yeaple (2005), where the wage premium is a pure selection phenomenon, and a heterogenous-firm /
worker-learning explanation, where the wage premium is a pure learning phenomenon.1 Our model
allows for each explanation to emerge as a special case as well as for a combination of the two. A
number of empirical hypotheses are derived directly from this theory model; some which are shared by
the two explanations and some which are not. These are subsequently tested on Danish matched
employer-employee data in order to assess the relative importance of the two explanations.
The heterogeneous-worker explanation has previously been developed carefully in Yeaple
(2005) in a setting where workers differ exogenously in skills and where ex-ante homogenous firms
endogenously choose between a more scale-intensive and a less scale-intensive technology. As skilled
workers have a comparative advantage in the scale-intensive technology, the firms that choose this
technology will employ more skilled workers, be larger, engage in international trade and pay higher
wages. In an earlier paper, Ekholm and Midelfart (2005) build a model with similar characteristics
where firms can choose between a “modern” and a “traditional” technology, where the former is more
scale-intensive. In equilibrium, firms choosing this technology therefore operate on a larger scale and
pay higher wages. Finally, Manasse and Turrini (2001) develop a model with heterogeneous
entrepreneurs, where the most able of these (the “superstars”) operate on a larger scale, engage in
2trade, employ workers of higher skills and as a consequence pay higher wages on average.
Our heterogeneous-firm / worker-learning explanation builds on Melitz’s (2003) idea that
firms differ exogenously in productivity (or costs); with only the most productive firms finding it
optimal to engage in export activities. In the present paper, this set-up is extended to differences in on-
the-job learning possibilities, which are proportional to a firm’s productivity, and which are
internalized by ex-ante homogeneous workers. On-the-job learning was introduced in Rosen (1972) in
a model of optimal occupational choices over an individual’s lifetime. It has later been formalized in
set-ups with foreign-owned firms and multinational enterprises (MNEs) by Ethier and Markusen
(1996), Markusen (2001), Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002). In these papers and in the
current one, learning is exogenous in the sense that it is not a “training” investment decision by the
firms.
Glass and Saggi (2002) thus build an oligopoly model where workers employed by the
foreign firm immediately get access to its superior technology. Hence, it must pay a wage premium to
prevent workers from immediately switching to other companies bringing along information about this
technology. In Fosfuri et al. (2001), Ethier and Markusen (1996), and Markusen (2001), on the other
hand, workers only learn about the superior technology following one period of employment. Hence,
workers are not immediately paid a higher wage in MNEs, but only over time. In all three papers, as
well as in our model, productivity transfers may arise when workers employed by MNEs move to
domestic firms. Recently, Görg et al (2007) have used a two-period bargaining framework to show
that if training is more productive and specific in foreign firms, workers in these firms will have a
steeper wage profile and therefore acquire a wage premium over time.
The present paper is the first to incorporate both explanations into a simple and tractable
model which also allows each of the explanations to emerge as a special case. We allow workers to
differ exogenously in skills and firms to choose endogenously between two technologies as in Yeaple
(2005). This is cast in a set-up with on-the-job learning possibilities as in, e.g., Markusen (2001), but
with potentially heterogeneous firms as in Melitz (2003), where firms now differ with respect to
learning possibilities. The model has a quasi OLG structure where workers live for two periods, but
32 Elements of both the heterogeneous-worker explanation and the heterogeneous-firm
explanation are found in the theoretical and empirical paper of Markusen and Trofimenko (2009). In
this paper, ex-ante identical firms can choose to employ foreign experts and ex-ante identical workers
learn from these experts.
3 Studies include (but are by no means confined to): Aitken et al. (1996), Doms and Jensen
(1998), Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), and Feliciano and Lipsey (2006).
firms are long lived.2
In the empirical part of the paper, we investigate a number of specific hypotheses that come
out of this model. First, we test the existence of a wage premium in foreign (and large) firms (as
predicted by both explanations), and how much of it that can be explained by differences in observed
and unobserved worker characteristics, i.e. worker heterogeneity. Second, we test three more specific
predictions of the worker-learning explanation: (i) that learning and therefore wage growth is higher in
foreign/large firms; (ii) that starting wages are lower in these firms; and (iii) that subsequent earnings
increase with experience from foreign-owned and large firms. 
To preview our results, we find support for both theories: The shares of the foreign-firm and
large-firm premiums explained by worker heterogeneity are in the neighborhood of 30-65% of the
total premiums, with the remainder consistent with learning. Furthermore, there is considerable
support for the predictions specific to the worker-learning explanation.
The foreign-firm wage premium has already been analysed extensively in the existing
empirical literature; see Lipsey (2004) for a review. Using plant- or firm-level data, a number of
studies have also tried to determine how much of the overall “wage-gap” between foreign-owned and
domestically-owned firms that can be explained by a higher average quality of the workers in the
foreign-owned firms.3 The general conclusion is that while part of the difference can be attributed to a
higher average quality of workers, a considerable part can only be explained by foreign owned firms
having different firm characteristics than the average domestically-owned firm; see Lipsey (2004).
While most of the empirical literature can only control for observable differences in average
worker characteristics across plants (and often has limited information on this), a few recent studies by
Martins (2004), Heyman et al. (2007), and Balsvik (2007) use matched employer-employee data. This
44 The literature referenced above also finds that controlling for differences in plant
characteristics, especially the establishment size, further reduces and sometimes even eliminates the
wage premium; see Lipsey (2004). Finally, there is also a large literature examining the effects of
foreign acquisitions on the wages of the employees; see Girma and Görg (2007), Almeida (2007) and
Huttunen (2007).
allows them to control for more detailed individual differences among the employees. All three
studies, however, find that a significant wage premium remains in MNEs also after controlling for
observable worker characteristics. This indicates that the heterogeneous-worker model may explain
part – but not all – of the wage premium of foreign firms.4
Recent studies by Andrews et al. (2007) and Martins (2008) also control for unobserved
worker differences using fixed effects, although in slightly different contexts. Andrews et al. (2007)
thus search for any evidence of take-over effects, whereas Martins (2008) analyzes movers between
domestic and foreign firms and find evidence of what he terms a “wage policy effect” as workers
increase their wage upon moving to a foreign firm.
As opposed to these studies, we provide an upper-bound estimate on the importance of the
heterogeneous-worker model. Thus, we control for observable as well as unobservable worker
characteristics (fixed effects) to examine how much of the wage premium that can be explained by ex-
ante worker differences. Furthermore, we distinguish explicitly between the importance of firm and
worker controls in the analysis of the wage premium. For example, a prediction that comes out of our
theory is that the foreign wage gap should disappear when controlling appropriately for firm size.
Turning to the more specific hypotheses related to the worker-learning explanation, the
existing evidence is much more limited. To our knowledge, Görg et al. (2007) is the only paper to
explicitly analyze whether part of the wage gap could be explained by higher learning in foreign firms.
Using data from Ghana, they find evidence that wage growth is higher in foreign firms, and only so
for workers receiving on the job training. In his analysis of movers, Martins (2008) also estimates
wage growth equations and finds evidence of higher wage growth for workers that move from
domestic to foreign firms compared to those who stay.
Our paper is thus the first to formally test whether higher learning in foreign firms may
5explain part of the wage premium in developed countries – relying on a much more extensive data set
than Görg et al. (2007). As opposed to previous studies, we also control for unobserved worker
differences (fixed effects) in analyzing this, and we test whether the effect disappears when controlling
for firm size as predicted by our worker-learning explanation. We also test whether the higher wage
growth is compensated for by lower starting wages.
Finally, the hypothesis that experience from foreign-owned firms also add to subsequent
wages (in a new job) has recently been considered by Görg and Strobl (2005), Martins (2005), Balsvik
(2007) and Pesola (2007). They all find evidence that previous experience from multinationals pays
off in subsequent employment. Compared to these studies, we explicitly test the importance of the
amount of previous experience from large (foreign) firms. For this purpose, we apply a very long
panel that allows us to appropriately capture such effects. Only Pesola (2007) has previously
considered the importance of the time spent in foreign firms (what we think of as the learning period)
for subsequent wages.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the theory model and
derive the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 tests the hypotheses.
Section 5 concludes. An appendix with details of the theory model and specifications of the variables
used in the empirical analysis is attached at the end.
62. A model of entry, productivity, and industry structure
The model will draw on the contributions of Melitz’s (2003) model of industry structure with
heterogeneous firms and Yeaple’s (2005) model of heterogeneous workers and ex-ante identical firms.
These are combined with a learn-on-the-job model of Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen
(2001) in which workers are ex-ante identical. Very significant simplifications of all three approaches
are made in order to provide a tractable model that combines the key ingredients of each. 
(1) There are two types of technologies available to domestic (D) and foreign (F) firms:
advanced (A) and basic (B), with firms using these technologies referred to as type-A and type-B
firms, respectively. Firms produce differentiated goods that are symmetric substitutes, denoted X.
(2) There is free entry of domestic and foreign firms into both types of technologies, but
foreign firms must pay a higher fixed cost to enter the domestic market (reminiscent of Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). In both countries, an unlimited potential number of firms can access the B
technology, and so foreign type-B firms will be excluded from the market due to their higher fixed
costs. More on type-A firm entry below.
(3) The model is quasi-dynamic. Firms are long lived, but fixed costs are per period, and
demand is stationary. There are no investment or borrowing decisions or any other intertemporal
features. Thus, we can analyze a single period in this “stationary” environment.
(4) The model also has a quasi-overlapping-generations feature, with two sets of workers (S-
and H-workers). Each worker has a two-period career. S-workers begin their careers as identical low-
skilled workers. Those workers who join type-B firms do not improve their productivity over time
while those who join type-A firms have at least as high productivity in their first period (as those who
join type-B firms) and learning results in higher productivity in the second period of their career.
Skills are not firm-specific, so experienced workers are priced in a competitive market, and their wage
path is such that young workers are indifferent between joining type-A and type-B firms. These ex-
ante identical workers are all referred to as S-workers, even though those that join type-B firms do not
increase their productivity over their career. 
(5) A second set of workers, denoted H (high skilled) are more productive in both periods of
75 We have worked out more complicated versions of our model. We are thus confident that
the assumptions such as (a) a fixed number of H-workers, and (b) no transiting workers, do not affect
the qualitative results. Switching firm type is important theoretically and empirically and below we
comment on an extension that includes workers switching firm types.
their two-period career, and they may or may not improve their productivity between periods.
Specifically, H-workers have an absolute advantage working with the type-A technology relative to
the S-workers, but are not more productive than S-workers with the type-B technology. We assume
that they are in limited fixed supply, so that all H-workers are employed with the type-A firms (i.e.,
when all the scarce H-workers are hired, the type-A firms still wish to hire additional S-workers).
(6) In the simplified version of the model presented here, workers do not transit between firm
types between periods: S- or H-workers cannot transfer enough of their productivity advantage to
type-B firms for this to be worthwhile and experience in type-B firms does not make these workers
more productive in type-A firms than new entrant workers.5
(7) Finally, the model is largely partial equilibrium. Expenditure on X-goods is fixed.
Furthermore, there is an unlimited supply of new S-workers available at a fixed wage, and a given
worker disappears after two periods. Both the endogenous numbers of domestic type-A and type-B
firms and the endogenous number of foreign type-A firms hire experienced and inexperienced workers
in a competitive market. The steady-state or stationarity assumption is that the number of S-workers
with experience from type-A firms available is equal to the number of inexperienced S-workers hired
by type-A firms.
Our notation is as follows:
labor productivity (in physical units of X output) of S-workers in type-A firms, where
i = 1 is an inexperienced worker and i = 2 is an experienced worker. Workers in type-
B firms do not learn and their productivity in both periods is normalized to .
 wage of an inexperienced S-worker (i = 1) and an experienced S-worker (i = 2) in a
type-A firm. These workers have an outside-option wage of one, so in type-B firms
these workers earn .
similarly defined productivity and wages for H-workers in type-A firms. 
8number of domestic type-A and type-B firms and foreign type-A firms, respectively.
These are variables determined by free entry. No foreign type-B firms enter.
prices of a representative differentiated good produced by a type-A and a
type-B firm, respectively.
outputs of a type-A firm produced by inexperienced and experienced S-workers,
respectively. 
outputs of a type-A firm produced by inexperienced and experienced H-workers,
respectively. 
output of a type-B firm produced by inexperienced or experienced workers.
* the discount factor, 0 < * = 1/(1+r) < 1, where r is some rate of interest/discount.
Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over an endogenous number, k, of differentiated
goods, and spend a fixed amount of income, I, on X-sector goods. F denotes the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. Each period’s demands do not depend on prices in the other period.
Demand for any good i is given by:
(1)
Under the so-called “large-group” assumption, individual firms are assumed to be too small to
influence the price index term in square brackets, and hence each firm’s perceived elasticity of
demand is just F and the optimal markup is 1/F.
The equilibrium output of each type-A (high-productivity) firm, whether foreign or domestic,
is determined by marginal revenue product less-than-or-equal to the wage. All workers within a firm
produce the same variety of output, but workers differ in productivity. There are five first-order
conditions for outputs in our model: four for a type-A firm (S- and H-workers in each period of their
two-period career), and one for workers (inexperienced or experienced) in type-B firms. We adopt a
complementarity representation of our model in which all equations are written as weak inequalities
each with an associated non-negative complementary variable. The pricing inequalities for output are:
9(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
We assume that fixed costs for type-A and type-B domestic firms are “purchased” and not part
of the firms’ value added, employment, and wages. This greatly simplifies notation without affecting
the results in any quantitative way. These fixed costs are denoted  for domestic type-B firms.
Analogous to Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), we assume that there is
a distribution of fixed costs across potential firms for their use of the type-A technology. Firms are
ordered in terms of proportionately increasing fixed costs, with foreign firms facing higher costs for
the same number of entrants. If  domestic and  foreign type-A firms enter, the fixed cost of the
marginal (highest cost) firms are given by  for domestic firms and by  for foreign
firms with . An equilibrium with free entry then identifies a zero-profit “cutoff” firm as
well as the number of domestic and foreign firms that enter.
Given (2)-(6), we have the well-known results that zero profits can simply be expressed as
markup revenues equal fixed costs. Let  denote the total output of
a type-A firm (domestic and foreign type-A firms that enter have the same output since they have the
same demand and marginal cost; there will just be fewer foreign firms). The three free-entry
conditions are thus:
(7)
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(8)
(9)
Finally, we have six supply-demand equations to determine six prices: four wages rates and
two representative X-prices (on goods from type-A and type-B firms, respectively). First, one
equation, with  as the complementary variable, is an arbitrage condition that the present value of
earnings over two periods from joining a type-A firm should equal the two-period return from joining
a type-B firm:
(10)
Second, the number of inexperienced S-workers in type-A firms should equal the number of
experienced S-workers employed in the second period; essentially a “steady-state” condition, where
the second-period wage is the complementary variable:
(11)
Third, let SH be the exogenous supply (number) of H-workers of each vintage, inexperienced (first
period) and experienced (second period). Supply equal to demand for these workers has the wages as
the complementary variables:
(12)
(13)
Finally, there are supply-demand equations for X-output with complementary variables being
the X-prices. Because of symmetry within firm types, we can reduce (1) to two representative supply-
demand equations; one for each firm type:
(14)
(15)
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Our model given by (2)-(15) thus constitutes fourteen non-linear inequalities in fourteen non-
negative variables. We solve this model analytically in Appendix A to this paper. It follows that type-
B firms are smaller in terms of output (and typically also in terms of employment). Type-B firms
therefore charge a higher price,  , in equilibrium. Furthermore, due to learning, S-workers
joining type-A firms receive higher second-period wages, but then have to accept a lower wage in the
first period.
Before we go into more detail with the implications of the model, we shall briefly consider a a
more complicated version in which workers may switch firm types after the first period. We do not
present the complete longer version here. Instead, we concentrate on the intuition: In the two-period
formulation, a worker from a type-B firm would never switch after one period to a type-A firm if there
was no learning at all in a type-B firm, because the switching worker would have to take a wage cut,
competing with new inexperienced workers in the type-A firm. But if the experience in a type-B firm
is of some value in a type-A firm, a worker from a type-B firm could switch to a type-A firm and still
earn a wage of one if that worker’s productivity in a type-A firm is somewhere between  and ,
i.e. there is some learning in a type-B firm but it is only useful if the worker switches. Specifically,
recall that prices and therefore marginal revenue products are different in type-A and type-B firms
( ), reflecting differences in firm size. Let  denote the productivity of a worker switching
from a type-B to a type-A firm after one period. A worker in a type-B firm is then indifferent to
switching when:
(16)
Our analytical appendix solves for this price ratio, which then implies that the indifference
productivity is given as:
   and thus   (17)
Thus, when switching from type-B to type-A firms is observed, the empirical implication is that
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among workers employed in type-A firms, those with a longer tenure in the firm (or more total
experience from type-A firms) should earn more than those with a short tenure.
Now, consider workers switching from type-A to type-B firms. A worker in a type-A firm
might want to switch even if he or she carries only a part of the higher type-A firm productivity to a
type-B firm. The reason is that, type-B firms are smaller and thus have a higher price  and a
higher marginal revenue product for a given productivity level. Let  denote the productivity of a
worker switching from a type-A to a type-B firm after one period. A worker from a type-A firm is then
indifferent to switching after one period if:
 (18)
Derivations in the appendix shows that this indifference condition reduces to: 
   and thus  (19)
Thus, if workers are observed to switch from type-A to type-B firms, the empirical observation is that,
among experienced type-B firm workers, those with more prior experience from type-A firms should
earn more.
In the remainder of this section, we will report and briefly discuss qualitative results from the
model (numerical simulations are available from the authors). Table 2.1 summarizes a number of
theoretical predictions from three different “versions” of the model: Version 1 (V1) is the pure case of
learning with no worker heterogeneity (no H-workers or H-workers identical to S-workers); Version 2
(V2) is a combined case of learning with a “large” number of H-workers; and Version 3 (V3) is the
pure case of worker heterogeneity with no learning. The predictions in Table 2.1 are phrased as seven
hypotheses where V1 predicts a “yes” for all seven. The hypotheses are tested empirically in the
following sections. Below, we shall first briefly go through the predictions of each of the three versions
of the model with respect to the seven hypotheses:
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V1: learning, no worker heterogeneity:   
Hypothesis 1: The average wage level is higher in foreign/large firms. Although the present
value of life-time earnings is the same for all workers under pure learning, average wages will be
higher in type-A firms due to a steeper wage profile in these firms combined with discounting. This
follows formally from (A3) in the appendix. Furthermore, type-A firms are larger than type-B firms
and all foreign firms are of type A. 
Hypothesis 2: Average wages in foreign firms are not higher when controlling for firm size.
This follows almost trivially from the first hypothesis since foreign firms are all of type A, but not all
type-A firms are foreign.
Hypothesis 3: Wages are higher in foreign/large firms even after controlling for time-invariant
observed and unobserved worker characteristics. This follows from Hypothesis 1 and the fact that
under V1, all workers are ex-ante identical.
Hypothesis 4: Wage growth is higher in foreign/large firms. This follows from the steeper
wage profile in type-A firms under learning. It also implies that wages are lower for inexperienced
workers in foreign/large firms. This latter is Hypothesis 7. Both hypotheses follow more formally from
(A3) in the appendix.
Hypothesis 5: The foreign-firm effect on wage growth disappears when controlling for firm
size. Again, this follows from the fact that foreign firms are all of type A, while not all type-A firms are
foreign.
Hypothesis 6: Past experience from foreign/large firms raises current wages. This is true both
when workers stay in the same firm type, as shown in (A3) of the appendix, and in the switching
extension discussed above, where it follows formally from (18) and (19).
 
V2: learning and H-workers:
The theory model in the case of V2 generates the same predictions as V1 for six of the seven
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hypotheses. The hypothesis that does not follow is number 7: It need no longer be the case that wages
for inexperienced workers are lower in foreign/large firms. While an S-worker will earn a lower
starting wage in a type-A firm than in a type-B firm, the presence of H-workers in type-A firms will
raise the average observed starting wage in the type-A firms. The wage for inexperienced H-workers is
given in (A5) of the appendix. If there are “enough” H-workers and their productivity exceed that of S-
workers by a sufficient amount, then the average starting wage in a type-A firm can exceed the wage in
type-B firms.
V3: no learning, worker heterogeneity:
While the simple Hypothesis 1 is supported in all three versions of the model (and confirmed
in many earlier empirical papers), there now emerge some important differences compared to V1. In
the pure heterogenous-worker model, V3, wages should not be higher in type-A firms once worker
observables and unobservables have been controlled for (Hypothesis 3); the difference between type-A
and type-B wages is totally due to selection and ex-ante worker differences. Nor should wage growth
be higher in type-A firms (Hypothesis 4) as shown in (A3) and (A4) in the appendix. Hence,
Hypothesis 5 does not apply under V3. Similarly, past experience from foreign/large firms should not
be important for wages (Hypothesis 6). And finally, starting wages will not be lower in type-A firms
(Hypothesis 7) as there is no learning in version 3 of the model. This follows formally from (A3) and
(A5) in the appendix.
3. Data
In this and the following section, we test the empirical hypotheses in Table 2.1 using matched
employer-employee data from Denmark. The data come from the Integrated Data Base of Labor
Market Research (IDA) compiled by Statistics Denmark, combined with firm level information about
foreign ownership, size, turnover, and exports. IDA contains register based annual data since 1980 on
15
6 For more information on the IDA data; see Abowd and Kramarz (1999).
7 A firm is classified as foreign owned by Statistics Denmark if foreigners ultimately own
more than 50% of the firm, and the foreign direct investment amounts to more than DKK 10 million.
8 The employment figures in Table 3.1 are based on firm-level information about full-time
employees. Note that part of the difference between foreign- and domestically-owned firms may be
due to the fact that some of the smaller foreign-owned firms are not classified as foreign-owned in the
data, as it requires FDI of a certain amount (see footnote above).
all individuals with Danish residence. It provides detailed information on individual background
variables such as education and family characteristics as well as detailed records of individual labor
market performance, including occupations and income.6
All workers are linked to establishments which in turn (from 1995 and onwards) can be linked
to firm-level information, which, e.g., allows us to identify all employees in foreign-owned firms in
Denmark. Information about foreign ownership is currently available only for the years 2000-2002.7 As
a consequence, in the regressions including foreign ownership, we have to rely on a panel for the years
2000 to 2002 (we shall refer to this as our “short” panel), while for the regressions without foreign
ownership, we can extend the panel to the period 1981-2003 (our “long” panel) but then have to rely on
establishment-level information.
Note that information about occupation in a given year is based on the individual’s occupation
in the last week of November. Hence, we cannot observe worker flows within a given year. In the
regressions to follow, we restrict attention to workers aged 20-65 years in the manufacturing and
service sectors and (in the long panel) who entered the labor market in 1981 or later. 
Table 3.1 presents the number of firms as well as the total employment of foreign-owned and
domestically-owned firms in Denmark in the years 2000-2002 divided into different size classes. While
the total stock of firms averaged approximately 245,000, only slightly more than 1% of these were
foreign owned in the years 2000-2002. However, as also shown in the Table, the foreign firms were
considerably larger on average, which implies that they accounted for 12-15% of total employment.8
This relationship between size and ownership is fully consistent with both the heterogenous-worker
version and the worker-learning version of our theory model, cf., e.g., Hypothesis 2.
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In Table 3.2, we provide a first check on the relationship between firm type, wage levels, and
wage growth (Hypotheses 1 and 4 in Table 2.1). The Table contains the average wages and average
wage growth rates for employees in foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, respectively, as well
as in different size classes. The income measure used is an hourly (nominal) wage reported by Statistics
Denmark. As predicted by both versions of our model (Hypothesis 1), the average wages reveal a
significant wage gap between domestically- and foreign-owned firms (more than 16% in each of the
three years) as well as between small and large firms (10-12% in each year).
Consistent with the worker-learning model, the Table also shows that average wage growth is
higher in larger firms (Hypothesis 4). As an example, the difference in wage growth rates between
small (<50 employees) and large (>500 employees) firms was 1.0 percentage points in 2001-2, which
corresponds to 36% higher annual wage growth in large firms. The difference between foreign-owned
firms and domestically-owned firms is, however, much smaller.
Note that the Danish labor market is characterized by a high degree of flexibility as firing costs
are extremely low. In that vein, Denmark compares better to US and UK labor markets than to the labor
markets of other Continental European countries. At the same time, the Danish welfare state takes care
of the unemployed through for example particularly high compensation rates which is why the Danish
model is often termed "Flexicurity".
The data also reveal that a considerable amount of individuals flow between foreign- and
domestically-owned firms, and between small and large firms, each year. Around 20% of those
employed in a foreign-owned firm in a given year move to another firm the following year. Out of
these, around two thirds end up in a domestically-owned firm. Of those employed in large (>500
employees) firms, a similar share move to another firm, and here around 1/3 end up in a small firm the
following year. This extensive amount of mobility is extremely useful for our subsequent analysis of
the foreign- and large-firm wage premiums, as it allows us to identify the premiums from individual
workers moving between firms thereby controlling for unobserved (time-invariant) individual
differences. 
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9 Alternatively, we could have used the average firm (or plant) size for the years in which the
firm is present in the data. It turns out that this yields very similar results.
4. Empirical Results
In this section, we test the empirical hypotheses from Table 2.1. First, we test the existence of a
wage premium in foreign/large firms, and how much of it that can be explained by differences in
observed and unobserved worker characteristics. This relates to Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2.1.
Second, we look for more specific evidence of the worker-learning theory by testing whether: (i) wage
growth is higher in foreign/large firms (Hypotheses 4 and 5); (ii) subsequent earnings increase with
experience from large and foreign-owned firms (Hypothesis 6); and (iii) initial wages are lower in
foreign/large firms (Hypothesis 7).
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present estimates of the wage premium using our short and long panel,
respectively. In the short panel, we use a 50% sample drawn at the worker level, while in the long
panel, we use a 10% sample also drawn at the worker level. Note that as our measure of firm (or
establishment) size, we use the number of employees at the beginning of an individual job-spell.
Hence, if worker i is observed in the same firm in two (or more) consecutive years, we use the size of
the firm in the first year as the measure of firm size for both (all) years.9 By, alternatively, using current
firm size, we may find an effect of firm size simply because growing firms have rising wages and
shrinking firms have declining wages. As both versions of our theory are silent on this issue, we wish
to eliminate this effect on the estimated wage premium. In other words, we are interested in the wage
premium across firms. Thus, the estimated wage premiums in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are identified from
workers switching jobs (and in the OLS regressions also from variation across workers employed in
different firms). In this respect, the large observed mobility of workers between firms is extremely
useful.
Similarly, the foreign dummy is set to equal one for all observations within a given job-spell if
the firm was foreign owned in at least one of the years in the spell. This is done to eliminate effects
from firms changing status during a job spell, whether this is due to measurement error or a take-over.
Again, as neither of the theories that we compare in this paper has anything to say about the effects of
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10 Furthermore, measurement errors in the sense that a firm erroneously changes status from
one year to the next would tend to bias the estimated foreign wage premium towards zero.
11 The estimated wage difference can be computed as (size1/size2)0.014 - 1 where 0.014 is the
estimated elasticity from Table 4.1. 
changes in ownership status, we choose to focus on the cross-sectional variation in the premium.10
All regressions include time dummies, three regional dummies and 16 industry dummies.
Hence, we are ex-ante eliminating that part of the wage premium which can be ascribed to a different
industry or regional pattern of the foreign-owned firms. The appendix contains more details on the
variables used in the regressions.
The first two columns in Table 4.1 present OLS estimates of the “raw” wage premiums in
foreign and large firms respectively, using the short panel. Both the heterogenous-worker version and
the worker-learning version of our theory model predict a wage premium in foreign and/or large firms
(Hypothesis 1). We find that foreign-owned firms pay approximately 9% higher wages and that a firm
with 100 employees pays wages that are approximately 3.4% higher than in a firm with 10
employees.11 In sum, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.
Controlling for both size and ownership as in column 3, we see that both premiums drop
somewhat. This is consistent with foreign ownership and firm size both being proxies for the same
thing (the type-A firms). However, we do not find that the foreign premium disappears completely as
predicted by Hypothesis 2, which is also shared by both theoretical explanations.
Hypothesis 3 differs between the two pure versions of the theory. According to the
heterogeneous-worker model, the premiums are entirely due to a different composition of ex-ante
heterogenous workers in foreign/large firms than in domestic/small firms. Hence the premium should
disappear when controls for worker observables and unobservables are added, whereas the worker-
learning theory predicts that a premium should remain.
Now, controlling for observable worker characteristics as in column 4 of Table 4.1 reduces the
estimated coefficients on foreign ownership and firm size to 0.069 and 0.009, respectively. Adding
individual fixed effects as in columns 5-8 controls for all time-invariant (observed as well as
19
12 As a further check, we tried to compute the correlation between the estimated individual
fixed effects and the firm size and foreign ownership variables and found only very small positive
correlation coefficients (in the order of 0.05 - 0.1), providing only weak signs of a sorting of initially
better workers into larger/foreign firms.
13 In the labor-market literature, the importance of worker heterogeneity for the large-firm
premium has been analyzed by, e.g., Abowd et al. (1999).
unobserved) worker characteristics. Consistent with the worker-learning model, the premiums remain
positive albeit lower than in the case without worker fixed effects. Hence, the evidence in relation to
Hypothesis 3 is supportive of both theoretical explanations.
Considering how the premium changes as we control for time-invariant worker characteristics
should actually give us an estimate of the relative importance of the heterogenous-worker theory in
explaining the wage premium. Specifically, comparing the wage premiums in columns 1 and 2 with
those in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.1 gives an estimate of the upper bound for the importance of the
heterogenous-worker model in explaining the observed wage premiums. We see that the heterogenous-
worker model can explain up to 30% (= (0.014-0.010)/0.014) of the size premium and up to 2/3 (=
(0.091-0.034)/0.091) of the wage premium for foreign vs domestic firms. This conclusion is not altered
with the inclusion of the time-variant experience measures in column 8.
In Table 4.2, we reach the same conclusions using our long panel. Controlling for time-
invariant observed and unobserved worker characteristics can explain approximately 20% (= (0.022-
0.018)/0.022) of the establishment size premium. Together, this leaves a significant share to be
explained by the worker-learning model (or competing theories).12
While a number of other studies (see Section 2) find that the foreign wage premium is reduced
when controlling for observable worker characteristics, we are not aware of any other study that
analyses how much of the premium that can actually be explained by observable as well as
unobservable worker characteristics.13
In sum, we find significant evidence of a premium in foreign/large firms consistent with
Hypothesis 1 which is common to both theories, although the foreign premium does not vanish when
controlling for firm size as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, as the premiums are reduced but
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14 In the short panel, we only have three years of data. Hence, we can only compute wage
growth for at most one job-spell for each worker.do not observe wage changes from different
employments for the same individual, as the computation of wage changes requires two consecutive
years with the same employer. As a consequence, the foreign/large premiums cannot be identified in
not eliminated by controlling for observable and unobservable time-invariant worker characteristics,
this is supportive of both theories (Hypothesis 3).
The last four hypotheses discriminate more directly between the empirical implications of the
two underlying theories. Hypothesis 4 states that according to the worker-learning model wage growth
should be higher in foreign/large firms, while this is not an implication of the heterogenous-worker
model. Furthermore, Hypothesis 5 says that the effect of foreign ownership on wage growth should
disappear once we control firm size, as size is a better proxy for the unobserved firm type. These
hypotheses are investigated in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 which regress annual wage growth within a job-spell
(i.e. it is required that the worker is in the same job in two subsequent years) on the same set of
explanatory variables as used in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
For the short panel in Table 4.3, we observe higher wage growth in both foreign and large
firms (columns 1 and 2). Furthermore, there does not seems to be higher wage growth in foreign firms
once we control for size (columns 3 and 4). These results are thus fully consistent with Hypotheses 4
and 5 for the worker-learning model. The estimated coefficient to firm size in column 3 implies that,
e.g., a doubling of firm size should be associated with an increase in the wage growth rate of 0.12
percentage points. With an annual (real) wage growth rate of 2%, this would amount to more than 5%
higher wage growth. The long panel (Table 4.4) confirms the higher wage growth in large
establishments (columns 1 and 2).
One could argue that the estimated effects in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 may be due to foreign/large
firms selecting workers that have more potential for wage growth. One could think of this as an
extended version of Yeaple’s heterogenous-worker model. According to Hypothesis 4, however, wage
growth should still be higher in foreign/large firms when controlling for worker unobservables if the
worker-learning story is correct. One way to check this is to include individual fixed effects in the
regressions. While this can only be done in the long panel,14 the results (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4)
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regressions including individual fixed effects. 
strongly suggest that the wage-growth premium does not reflect large (or foreign) firms selecting
“high-growth workers”. The estimated coefficient thus increases significantly (by more than 50%)
when adding individual fixed effects. Hence, the evidence in relation to Hypotheses 4 and 5 clearly
supports the worker-learning model.
While a number of studies have previously dealt with the relationship between ownership or
size and wage levels, much fewer studies have considered the effects on wage growth. In a somewhat
different context, Møen (2005), finds higher wage growth in R&D intensive firms. In a cross-sectional
setting, Pearce (1990) has also previously found higher wage growth in large firms, whereas Barron et
al. (1987) found a negative relationship between size and wage growth.
Hypothesis 6 also differs between the two pure versions of the theory. It states that past
experience from foreign/large firms (or establishments) influences current wages positively according
to the worker-learning model (V1). Workers with previous experience from large/foreign firms should
earn more than workers with experience only from small/domestic firms.
To test this hypothesis, Table 4.5 contains estimates of an extended version of the model in
Table 4.2. While columns 1-2 and 4-5 are similar to those in Table 4.2, columns 3 and 6 now also
include a measure of total “Experience from large establishments”; i.e. years employed at a large
establishment over the entire career. The coefficient to this variable will capture the additional effect of
experience (from current as well as previous employments) when experience is from a large
establishment. Furthermore, to distinguish between effects from current and previous employments, the
columns also include “Large x Tenure”, which captures tenure (i.e., the total number of years with the
current employer) given that the current establishment is large. A positive coefficient to this latter
variable will indicate that large-establishment experience obtained in the current employment
relationship has a more positive effect than large-establishment experience obtained in previous
employments.
It turns out that while “Experience” in general pays off (around 3% per year), “Experience
22
15 Note also that general experience is not valued more in large firms as the coefficient to
“Large x Experience” is zero (slightly negative in column 6, in fact). This is also fully consistent with
the worker-learning theory.
from large establishments” adds another 1.5% indicating that experience from large establishments is
indeed more valuable than experience from small establishments. Furthermore, as the coefficient to
“Large x Tenure” is slightly negative, large-establishment experience acquired in previous
employments is (at least) as important as large-establishment experience acquired in the current
employment. This is strongly supportive of the idea of learning and transferable skills as stated in
Hypothesis 6.15
Furthermore, these effects are preserved with the inclusion of worker fixed effects (Table 4.5,
column 6), and also with the inclusion of establishment fixed effects (results not shown but available
from authors upon request). Hence, the effects of previously acquired skills at large establishments are
not due to ex-ante “better” workers having more experience from large establishments, and they do not
disappear when controlling for current establishment characteristics. Related to this, Martins (2005),
Balsvik (2007) and Pesola (2007) also find evidence that previous experience from multinationals pays
off in subsequent employment. 
Finally, hypothesis 7 states that according to the worker-learning model, wages for
inexperienced workers should be lower in foreign/large firms. This can be tested indirectly by looking
at the estimated coefficient to the (log of the) establishment size variable in column 3 of Table 4.5.
With the various measures for experience and tenure included, this coefficient should reflect the effect
of establishment size on the initial wage. As the coefficient is positive, it does not support the pure
worker-learning model (V1). The positive coefficient in the OLS regression in column 3 is, however,
consistent with the heterogeneous-worker story (V3) and the “mixed” version (V2). 
In column 6, we include worker fixed effects. In this case, the coefficient on plant size is
identified from comparing (starting wages of) different job spells by the same worker (controlling for
the amount of total experience). The fact that it is still positive is, however, not consistent with either of
the two pure theories. 
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In sum, the evidence in relation to Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 provides considerable support for the
worker-learning model as wage growth is higher in foreign/large firms and as skills acquired in these
firms are transferable to subsequent employments. The evidence relating to Hypothesis 7 (without
worker fixed effects), on the other hand, is only partly supportive of the heterogeneous worker or
mixed model, and not the worker-learning model. 
6. Summary and Conclusions
The paper is motivated by the interests by both researchers and policy makers in possible
beneficial effects of foreign companies on local companies and workers. 
Theoretically, we contrast two theories: One that assumes ex-ante worker heterogeneity (the
heterogenous-worker model) and one that assumes ex-ante firm heterogeneity (the worker-learning
model). Our theoretical model embeds both of these in a relatively simple framework, and we show
how both can give rise to a wage premium. The heterogenous-worker model yields a wage premium as
more able workers sort into scale intensive firms which are also the international and larger firms. In
the worker-learning model, ex-ante identical workers learn more in high-productivity firms which are
also larger in equilibrium. Assuming a competitive labor market, we show that a wage premium may
then arise due to discounting. 
Our basic worker-learning model does not involve “spillovers” as the learning effects become
fully internalized by the agents. However, the model is consistent with higher wages for workers with
previous experience from foreign firms (which may look like spillovers through worker mobility) and
with higher wages in sectors with a larger share of foreign firms. Thus, we provide an explanation for
these empirical observations which does not rely on the presence of externalities.
We have particularly well-suited data for analyzing the relative empirical importance of the
two theories. First, by having matched employer-employee data, we can control for observable as well
as unobservable differences in worker characteristics. Second, by having a long panel, we can analyze
the importance of learning both in current and subsequent employment. 
We find that while the heterogenous-worker model may explain between 20% and 30% of the
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observed wage premium in large firms and about 66% in foreign firms, there is also considerable
evidence of the worker-learning model. Worker learning is supported by the findings that wage growth
is higher in large firms - also when controlling for unobservable worker characteristics - and that
experience from these firms matters positively for wages in subsequent employment. Controlling for
firm size reduces the foreign-firm premium by about 15-20% for wage levels and eliminates it for wage
growth; results which are consistent, though not completely, with our model, which predicts both
should be fully eliminated when controlling for firm size.
25
Appendix A: Analytical solution
This appendix gives the analytical solution to the model in the case where there is an interior
solution in which type-A firms use both types of labor (the number of H-workers is sufficiently small)
and both domestic type-A and type-B firms enter.
From (6), our choice of gives us , and then (9) gives us :
(A1)
Wages for S-workers in type-A firms can be solved for from (2), (3), and (10). From (2) and (3), we
get:
(A2)
Using these in (10) gives:
 (A3)
 where   and .
Given that we know  from (A3), we can solve for the price of an A-good from (2): 
(A4)
Now we can use (4) and (5) along with (A4) to solve for the high-skilled wages:
(A5)
Now, divide (14) by (15), and using (A1) and (A4) for the prices, we have:
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16  and  can be solved from (11)-(13) and (A7).
 (A6)
where , and from (A1):
  16 (A7)
Now that we have the price of an A-good from (A4) and the quantity from (A7), we can solve
for the number of domestic and foreign type-A firms from (7) and (8):
(A8)
This in turn means that the equilibrium “cutoff” fixed cost for domestic and foreign type-A firms is
given in (7) and (8) by:
(A9)
Because demand is symmetric and marginal costs are equal for domestic and foreign type-A firms, the
cutoff fixed cost is the same, but fewer foreign firms can enter.
Finally, we can check that the type-A firms are not only larger in output relative to B firms, but
also in employment. The number of workers in a type-A firm will be between two extremes: one in
which there are only S-workers (SH = 0) and one in which the supply of H-workers is large enough to
just squeeze out all S-workers (so (A7) remains valid). In each of these cases, we know that the number
of workers from each vintage is the same, so that the number of workers in a representative firm is just
the total output in (A7) divided by the average productivity of a worker. Let us express this relative to
the number of workers in a type-B firm which is just equal to a type-B firm’s output in (A1).  So for a
type-A firm using only S-workers, the number of workers relative to a type-B firm is given by:
(A10)
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17 Specifically,  implies that
employment of a type-A firm is 1.984 times that of a type-B firm if all workers are H-workers, and
2.645 times that of a type-B firm if all workers are S-workers.
whereas for a type-A firm using only H-workers, the number of workers relative to a type-B firm is
given by:
(A11)
As a check, note that if there is no productivity advantage of S- or H-workers, , then
(A10) and (A11) reduce to one as they should.
(A10) and (A11) are messy due to the presence of * combined with higher second-period
productivity. Recall that the expression in brackets must be greater than one and F >1. Sufficient
conditions for (A10) to be greater than one (type-A firms have higher employment) are that either there
is no learning or there is no discounting. If * and F are small (* close to zero and F close to one) and
second-period productivity is much higher, then (A10) could be less than one. In addition, (A11) could
be less than one if H-workers are much more productive. But even then, employment will be closer to
(A10) than (A11) if the number of H-workers is small.
As an example to put this in perspective, with a productivity growth of 33 percent between
periods, 33 percent higher productivity for an H-worker in each period relative to an S-worker, an
elasticity of F = 3, and a 50 percent discount factor, a type-A firm will still have twice as many workers
even if the work force contains only H-workers.17
A final variable in the model, though not of much interest, is the number of domestic type-B
firms. This can be solved for from (14) or (15) since everything else in those equations is now known.
Note from (A8) that the number of domestic type-A firms does not depend on the number of foreign
type-A firms, nor do the prices and X quantity variables in (14) and (15). Taken together, these results
imply that the entry of additional foreign firms “crowds out” domestic type-B firms, not type-A firms.
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With enough foreign firms, domestic type-B firms would disappear entirely, and the average domestic
and average foreign firm would be identical.
Appendix B: Definitions of variables used in regressions
 Variables available in both panels
Variable  Definition
Hourly wage
(continuous variable)
Wages divided by number of hours worked. The number of hours is imputed
from mandatory pension payments, which are determined by the number of
hours in employment per week. These variable is computed by Statistics
Denmark.
Experience
(continuous variable).
This variable is a continuous measure of actual labor market experience based
on the number of days in employment over the worker’s career. Experience is
measured in number of years of full time work.
Years of education
(count variable)
Scheduled number of years of completed education. Examples: High-school =
12 years; Master degree = 18 years.
Industry 
(dummy variables)
A full set of industry dummies for 17 industries of the manufacturing and
service sectors.
Variables only available in the short panel
Variable  Definition
Foreign
(dummy variable).
Takes the value one for workers employed in firms where foreigners
ultimately own more than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more than
DKK 10 million. Zero otherwise.
Firm size
(count variable).
The average number of full-time employees (within a year) in the firm where
the individual is employed. The firm is defined as the legal entity which
employs the worker.
Variables only available in the long panel
Variable  Definition
Establishment size
(dummy variable).
The number of employees in the last week of November at the establishment
where the individual is employed. An establishment is defined by its address. 
Tenure
(count variable)
The number of years employed at the current establishment. Tenure is reset to
zero when the individual changes establishment. 
Large
(dummy variable)
 
Takes the value one for workers employed at establishments with more than
50 employees. Zero otherwise. The dummy variable Large is then interacted
with Experience and Tenure.
Experience from large
establishments
(count variable)
Total number of years of employment at establishments with more than 50
employees, measured from the beginning of the individual’s career to the
current date.
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18 Foreign firm effect falls by 15-20% when controlling for firm size, but remains significant.
19 NA: not applicable; no foreign-firm effect predicted with or without firm-size control.
20 Due to space limitations, we do not formally model workers switching firm type in our
theory section, but hypothesis 6 is supported by the theory.
Table 2.1:  Theoretical predictions, empirical results
N.B. all results are the same for large firm and foreign firms, so they are not broken out separately.
Simulation model version:
V1: pure learning model: no H workers, learning
V2: mixed model: “large” number of H workers, learning
V3: pure selection model: H workers present, no learning
E: empirical results
V1 V2 V3 E
Hypothesis 1: 
Average wage level higher in large/foreign firms Yes Yes Yes
Empirics: Column 1 of Tables 4.1 and 4.2 Yes
Hypothesis 2: 
Foreign firm effect on average wage level disappears Yes Yes Yes
when controlling for firm size
Empirics: Column 2 versus 3 in Table 4.1 No18
Hypothesis 3: 
Wages higher in foreign/large firms after controlling for Yes Yes No
time-invariant worker observables/unobservables
Empirics: Tables 4.1 and 4.2 Yes
Hypothesis 4:
Wage growth higher in foreign/large firms Yes Yes No
also after controlling for worker characteristics
Empirics: Tables 4.3 and 4.4 Yes
Hypothesis 5: 
Foreign firm effect on wage growth disappears Yes Yes NA19
when controlling for firm size
Empirics: Column 2 versus 3 in Table 4.3 Yes
Hypothesis 6:20
Past experience from foreign/large firms important Yes Yes No
for current wages, also when controlling for 
worker characteristics
Empirics: Columns 3 and 6 in Table 4.5 Yes
Hypothesis 7:
Wage for inexperienced workers lower in foreign/large firms Yes No No
Empirics: Implicit in Tables 4.2 and 4.5 (see text) No
Table 3.1: Firm Types and Employment
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
0-49 241,946 1,966 240,393 2,037 237,605 2,119
50-499 2,632 573 2,631 579 2,586 564
500+ 195 58 194 52 186 55
Total 244,773 2,597 243,218 2,668 240,377 2,738
0-49 551,159 23,245 543,985 23,738 537,882 24,250
50-499 302,658 84,765 304,132 88,435 299,516 86,621
500+ 322,316 74,561 321,540 75,598 298,222 84,360
Total 1,176,133 182,571 1,169,657 187,771 1,135,620 195,231
Table 3.2: Firm Types, Average Wages and Wage Growth
2000 2001 2002 2000-1 2001-2
Absolute numbers
2000 2001 2002
Firm Size
(# employees) Firms
Employment
Average wages Wage growth
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector. The division of firms into size classes is based on the average number of 
employees over the year. 
Domestic 174.89 183.02 186.93 5.0% 3.2%
Foreign 203.77 212.33 218.32 5.0% 3.3%
Small (0-49) 167.68 175.62 178.75 4.8% 2.7%
Medium (50-499) 186.13 194.70 199.68 5.0% 3.5%
Large (500+) 185.41 193.98 199.93 5.2% 3.7%
Note: The table includes all full-time workers in the private sector, aged 20-65 years. The division of firms into 
size classes is based on the average number of employees over the year. Average wages are hourly wages 
in DKK.
Table 4.1: Firm Type and Wage Levels (short panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE
Log(firm size) 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.009
(0.00014)** (0.00015)** (0.00013)** (0.00019)** (0.0002)** (0.00019)**
Foreign 0.091 0.077 0.069 0.000 0.034 0.027 0.027
(0.00083)** (0.00084)** (0.00072)** (0.00102)** (0.00104)** (0.00103)**
Age 0.039
(0.00027)**
Age2 -0.0005
(0.000003)**
Experience 0.016 0.053
(0.00015)** (0.00124)**
Experience2 -0.0002 -0.0010
(0.000004)** (0.000008)**
Years of education 0.050
(0.00013)**
Female -0.191
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
(0.00055)**
Observations 1,546,933  1,555,378  1,546,932  1,526,776  1,546,933  1,555,378  1,546,932  1,546,932  
Number of individuals -             -             -             -             632,460     634,662     632,460     632,460     
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.37 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11
Note: The table is based on a panel from 2000-2002. The panel includes a 50% sample of all workers in the manufacturing and service industries 
drawn randomly at the worker level. All workers are aged 20-65. Foreign=1 for workers employed in firms where foreigners ultimately own more 
than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more than DKK 10 million – in at least one year during a job spell. Firm size refers to the number of full-
time employees in the first year of a job spell. Time-, regional- and industry- effects are included in all regressions.  The reported R-squared for the 
fixed effects regressions are based on the demeaned regression (i.e. after removing the fixed effects). Standard errors are in parentheses (robust 
for OLS results). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 4.2: Establishment Size and Wage Levels (long panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE
Log(establishment size) 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.016
(0.00035)** (0.00031)** (0.00041)** (0.0004)**
Age 0.062 0.125
(0.00053)** (0.00075)**
Age2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000007)** (0.000008)**
Experience 0.033 0.027
(0.00032)** (0.00048)**
Experience2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000012)** (0.000015)**
Tenure 0.018 0.007
(0.00047)** (0.00049)**
Tenure2 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000034)** (0.000037)**
Years of education 0 041
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
  .
(0.00024)**
Female -0.157
(0.00101)**
Observations 706,713                   706,713                   706,713                   706,713                   
Number of individuals -                          -                          116,741                   116,741                   
R-squared 0.25 0.42 0.38 0.41
Note: The table is based on a panel from 1981-2003. The panel includes a 10% sample of all workers in the manufacturing and 
service industries drawn randomly at the worker level. All workers are aged 20-65 and entered the Danish labor market in 1981 or
later. Establishment size refers to the number of full-time employees at the establishment in the first year of a job spell. Time-, 
regional- and industry- effects are included in all regressions. The reported R-squared for the fixed effects regressions are based 
on the demeaned regression (i.e. after removing the fixed effects). Standard errors are in parentheses (robust for OLS results). * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 4.3: Firm Type and Wage Growth (short panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Log(firm size) 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.17
(0.009)** 0.00 (0.009)** (0.009)**
Foreign 0.12 -0.06 -0.08
(0.048)* (0.049) (0.049)
Age -0.64
(0.021)**
Age2 0.006
(0.0002)**
Experience -0.09
(0.012)**
Experience2 0.002
(0.0003)**
Years of education 0.08
(0.009)**
Dependent variable: dlog(hourly wages)
Female 0.34
(0.038)**
Observations 753,648                756,036                753,647                745,174                
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Note: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The table is based on a panel from 2000-2002. The panel includes a 50% 
sample of all workers in the manufacturing and service industries drawn randomly at the worker level. All workers are aged 
20-65 and worked in the same establishment the year before. Foreign=1 for workers employed in firms where foreigners 
ultimately own more than 50% of the firm, and FDI amounts to more than DKK 10 million – in at least one year during a job 
spell. Firm size refers to the number of full-time employees in the first year of a job spell. Time-, regional- and industry-
effects are included in all regressions.  Standard errors are in parentheses (robust for OLS results). * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.
Table 4.4: Establishment Size and Wage Growth (long panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE
Log(establishment size) 0.24 0.20 0.34 0.35
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.051)** (0.051)**
Age 0.00 -1.29 0.00 -1.75
0.00 (0.042)** 0.00 (0.082)**
Age2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
0.00 (0.0006)** 0.00 (0.0008)**
Experience 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.08
0.00 (0.029)** 0.00 (0.056)**
Experience2 0.000 -0.0124 0.000 0.0001
0.00 (0.0009)** 0.00 (0.0014)
Tenure 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.46
0.00 (0.039)** 0.00 (0.053)**
Tenure2 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.029
0.00 (0.0023)** 0.00 (0.0035)
Years of education 0.00 0.38 0.00
Dependent variable: dlog(hourly wages)
0.00 (0.019)** 0.00
Female 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00
0.00 (0.084)** 0.00 0.00
Observations 397,686                   397,686                   397,686                   397,686                   
Number of individuals -                           -                           83,041                     83,041                     
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The table is based on a panel from 1981-2003. The panel includes a 10% sample of all workers 
in the manufacturing and service industries drawn randomly at the worker level. All workers are aged 20-65, entered the Danish labor 
market in 1981 or later and worked in the same establishment the year before. Establishment size refers to the number of full-time 
employees at the establishment in the first year of a job spell. Time-, regional- and industry- effects are included in all regressions. The 
reported R-squared for the fixed effects regressions are based on the demeaned regression (i.e. after removing the fixed effects). Standard 
errors are in parentheses (robust for OLS results). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 4.5: Previous Establishment Size and Wage Levels (long panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Indv. FE Indv. FE Indv. FE
Log(establishment size) 0.022 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.019
(0.00035)** (0.00031)** (0.00045)** (0.00041)** (0.0004)** (0.00053)**
Age 0.062 0.059 0.125 0.121
(0.00053)** (0.00054)** (0.00075)** (0.00077)**
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)** (0.00001)**
Experience 0.033 0.031 0.027 0.027
(0.00032)** (0.00041)** (0.00048)** (0.00054)**
Experience2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00001)** (0.00002)** (0.00001)** (0.00002)**
Tenure 0.018 0.017 0.007 0.005
(0.00047)** (0.00069)** (0.00049)** (0.00068)**
Tenure2 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0004
(0.00003)** (0.00005)** (0.00004)** (0.00005)**
Female 0.000 -0.157 -0.158
0 (0.00101)** (0.00101)**
Years of education 0 041 0 040
Dependent variable: log(hourly wage)
  . .
(0.00024)** (0.00024)**
Experience from large establishments 0.015 0.016
(0.00053)** (0.0007)**
(Experience from large estab.)2 -0.0005 -0.0009
(0.00004)** (0.00004)**
Large x Tenure -0.005 -0.002
(0.001)** (0.00102)**
Large x Tenure2 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.00007)** (0.00008)**
Large x Experience -0.003 -0.004
(0.00045)** (0.00048)**
Large x Experience2 0.00002 0.00013
(0.00002) (0.00002)**
Observations 706,713               706,713               706,713               706,713               706,713               706,713               
Number of individuals 0 0 -                       116,741               116,741               116,741               
R-squared 0.25                     0.42                     0.42                     0.38                     0.41                     0.41                     
Note: The table is based on a panel from 1981-2003. The panel includes a 50% sample of all workers in the manufacturing and service industries drawn randomly at the worker 
level. All workers are aged 20-65 and entered the Danish labor market in 1981 or later.  Establishment size refers to the number of full-time employees at the establishment in 
the first year of a job spell. Large =1 for workers employed in firms where Establishment size > 50 in the first year of the job spell. Time-, regional- and industry- effects are 
included in all regressions. The reported R-squared for the fixed effects regressions are based on the demeaned regression (i.e. after removing the fixed effects). Standard 
errors are in parentheses (robust for OLS results). * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
